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Section 7 and Administrative Law 
Deference — No Room at the Inn?1 
David Mullan∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 poses 
special problems for Administrative Law. What aspects of the 
administrative process engage the right to “life, liberty and security of 
the person”? For those that do, what constitute the principles of 
fundamental justice in both a substantive and a procedural sense? Where 
the procedural elements of “fundamental” justice are triggered, what is 
the relationship between the constitutional standard and traditional 
common law precepts of procedural fairness and natural justice? When 
state interests are set up in answer to a claim of violation of the 
principles of fundamental justice, within what framework should courts 
consider those claims: as part of the process of delineating the scope of 
the “principles of fundamental justice” or in the context of a section 1 
justification where the burden of persuasion rests clearly on the state?3  
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 Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. 
1
 This paper owes much to conversations that I have had over the years with my former 
co-teacher of Advanced Constitutional Law, David Stratas, and also to his paper: David Stratas, 
“Constitutional Remedies in Administrative Proceedings: Supervision, Striking Sections, Policing 
Discretions, Standards of Review and Prospects for the Future” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar 
Association Conference “The Constitution in Your Administrative Law Practice”, March 2, 2004, 
at 6-10). I am indebted to him for his insights, which have been a great influence on my thinking 
about this issue. See also Geneviève Cartier, “The Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Administrative Law — The Case of Discretion” in 
David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), at 61; Lorne M. 
Sossin, “Reconciling Constitutional Law with Administrative Reality: The Charter and the 
Dilemmas of Discretion” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar Association Conference “The 
Constitution in Your Administrative Law Practice”, March 2, 2004); and David A. Wright, 
“Evaluating Policy-Based Decisions for Charter Compliance” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar 
Association Conference “The Constitution in Your Administrative Law Practice”, March 2, 2004). 
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”]. 
3
 I have written about a number of these issues previously. See e.g., “The Charter and 
Administrative Law” in The 2002 Isaac Pitblado Lectures — The Charter: Twenty Years and 
Beyond (Winnipeg: Law Society of Manitoba,  2004), at X-1.  
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These are all issues that have been the subject of both judicial 
scrutiny and academic commentary. In many respects, they remain 
questions to which the Supreme Court has yet to provide definitive 
answers. Indeed, they could each justify detailed treatment within the 
time allocated to me today. However, I have chosen to confine my 
remarks on this occasion to another aspect of section 7’s intersection 
with Administrative Law: What standard of review should the courts 
apply in reviewing decisions by statutory and prerogative authorities on 
whether the right to life, liberty and security of the person is affected by 
an administrative process and, in situations where the right is engaged, 
whether any deprivation has been in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice? At either of these stages, is there any place for 
judicial deference to the judgment of state authorities? Indeed, this is a 
question that transcends section 7 and resonates whenever statutory 
authorities are making decisions (including the exercise of discretion) 
that have an impact on Charter rights and freedoms. As recent case law 
illustrates, it is also a question that is integrally related to the role that 
section 1 plays when statutory authorities are trading in Charter rights 
and freedoms. 
In fact, the immediate stimulus for this paper was the March 2, 2006 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Multani v. Commission 
scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.4 There, a majority of the Court, in a 
judgment penned by Charron J.,5 flatly rejected any role for 
Administrative Law principles and standard of review analysis in the 
evaluation of claims that administrative action has violated Charter 
rights and freedoms. In determining the constitutional questions that 
arise from such claims, there is no room for the argument that the 
reviewing court owes any degree of deference to any aspect of the 
administrative process that has generated the challenge.  
In this paper, I argue that this articulation of an apparently general 
principle ignores other recent Supreme Court of Canada authority. As a 
consequence, the Court seems to be taking inconsistent positions on the 
relationship between Administrative Law and Constitutional Law review, 
a situation that poses challenges for litigants, counsel and lower courts. It 
is also questionable whether such a blanket denial of the relevance of 
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 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 2006 SCC 6 [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
5
 Chief Justice McLachlin, Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ. concurred in Charron J.’s 
judgment. Justices Deschamps and Abella, in a joint judgment, concurred in the result but reached 
that conclusion by a different route. The same was true of LeBel J. 
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Administrative Law principles to constitutional adjudication is appropriate 
from broader policy perspectives. There may well be occasions where the 
courts should afford deference to statutory and prerogative authorities 
even when the exercise of their powers engages constitutional rights. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES — THE BACKGROUND 
For almost 20 years, the Canadian law of judicial review of 
administrative action has been bedevilled by the imperative of having to 
establish a standard of review as a prelude to any engagement with the 
merits of the exercise of statutory (and, for that matter, prerogative) 
authority. By reference to the various criteria established by the 
Supreme Court as the elements of its edict that the standard of review 
depends on a “pragmatic and functional” approach, which of three 
standards applies to the particular exercise of authority that is subject to 
judicial review — [in]correctness, unreasonableness or patent un-
reasonableness? As scores of Supreme Court of Canada judgments 
illustrate,6 this is in no sense a self-applying or bright line delineation 
exercise. 
Nonetheless, ask most administrative lawyers what standard applies 
when a statutory authority is dealing with constitutional (including 
Charter and perhaps even Canadian Bill of Rights)7 questions and the 
most likely answer is “correctness”. Why? Because, from time to time, 
the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have said so. We see this most 
clearly in the Supreme Court’s case law involving an issue over which 
there has been considerable vacillation: the entitlement of statutory 
authorities to determine constitutional questions. In the latest 
pronouncement on this vexed question,8 the Court appears to have 
endorsed a strong presumption in favour of tribunals having implicit 
authority to deal with constitutional questions in general and Charter 
questions in particular. However, irrespective of the existence of such a 
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 The foundation judgment is Union des employés de service, local 298 v. Bibeault, 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 101, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, and the most authoritative more recent articulations 
can be found in Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 18, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 and Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982. 
7
 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
8
 Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 
S.C.R. 504. 
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strong presumption, the Court’s position has always been that where 
that right to consider constitutional questions exists, the standard of 
judicial scrutiny of any such exercise of authority is that of correctness.9 
What may, however, be critical is that, at least until Multani, most 
of this case law has involved situations where the Court has been 
concerned with the entitlement of statutory authorities to deal with 
questions as to the constitutional validity of constitutive or relevant 
legislation. It therefore seemed to be important to read the Court’s 
apparent assertion of a universal standard of correctness review in a 
context-sensitive manner.  
Indeed, when one comes to the section 7 jurisprudence involving 
judicial review of exercises of discretion engaging Charter rights and 
freedoms, the picture that emerges is quite different. In this respect, the 
most prominent example remains Suresh v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration).10 However, the Court’s position can be 
illustrated much more simply by reference to its judgment in the 
companion case of Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration),11 judgment in which was delivered the same day.  
As was the case with Suresh, Ahani involved the process of making 
removal orders against a person who in the opinion of the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration “constitutes a danger to the security of 
Canada”, a discretion that applies even in the case of Convention 
refugees. For the purposes of its analysis, the Court accepted that the 
making of a removal order would engage the Charter where the subject 
of the order would “face a substantial risk of torture on removal”.12 
However, notwithstanding that, the Court in no way accepted the 
proposition that the courts should conduct judicial review of any such 
decision on a straight correctness basis. 
First, the Court segmented the decision-making process into three 
stages. The first stage was the ministerial determination that the person 
constituted a “danger to the security of Canada”.13 This precondition to 
the exercise of jurisdiction was subject to review only if “patently 
unreasonable”. That meant it must have been  
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 Id., at para. 31, reaffirming Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, at 17. 
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 [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Suresh”]. 
11
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 4, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72 [hereinafter “Ahani”]. 
12
 Id., at para. 17. 
13
 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 53(1)(b). 
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. . . made arbitrarily or in bad faith, cannot be supported on the 
evidence, or did not take into account the appropriate factors. A 
reviewing court should not reweigh the factors or interfere merely 
because it would have come to a different conclusion.14 
As I have pointed out elsewhere,15 this process of segmenting the 
decision-making process to remove an important element of it from the 
very application of section 7 in itself has ramifications for the conduct 
of judicial review of decisions, which can have an impact on the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person.  
However, much more directly, the Court’s pronouncement on how 
courts should approach the next stage of the process suggests very 
strongly the need for judicial deference to at least elements of decisions 
about the reach and application of section 7. In deciding whether 
someone who is a danger to the security of Canada faces a substantial 
risk of torture on deportation, courts are directly determining whether 
life, liberty and security of the person is at stake. According to the 
Supreme Court, such decisions are “largely fact-based” and, as such, 
“largely outside the realm of expertise of reviewing courts and possess a 
negligible legal element. Considerable deference is therefore required”.16 
What is then left in this decision-making process for those that 
actually get in that door is the determination whether such a person 
should in fact be deported despite the substantial risk of torture. What is 
the standard of review applicable to this third stage in the process? 
Ahani does not purport to answer that question nor, in fact, does Suresh. 
Certainly, the Court in Suresh controversially seemed to accept the 
possibility that deportation to torture might be justified “in exceptional 
circumstances”.17 However, it did not go on to elaborate what standard 
of review would be applied to such an exercise of discretion. Rather, it 
left the question dangling by asserting that the ambit of any such 
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 Ahani, supra, note 11, at para. 16. 
15
 “Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond — Interpreting the Conflicting Signals” 
in Dyzenhaus, supra, note 1, at 21.  
16
 Ahani, supra, note 11, at para. 17. 
17
 Supra, note 10, at para. 78. 
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“exceptional discretion” had to “await future cases”.18 It also left open 
the question whether the justification for such a decision would be 
evaluated in the context of “the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of 
the Charter or under s. 1”.19 I will later return to the question whether it 
is a necessary implication of either or both of those balancing exercises 
that the Court is conducting correctness review. 
Irrespective, however, of how the Court ultimately comes down on 
this last question, what is clear is that even where a threat to life, liberty 
and security of the person as serious as torture is in issue, there will be 
(at certain levels) deference to executive judgment, particularly where 
that executive judgment involves factual determinations and, one might 
add, factual determinations with a national security element.  
The truth, of course, is that in the world of general Constitutional 
Law, this notion of deference to statutory authority assessment of 
“constitutional facts” is not a novel concept. Thus, in the domain where 
administrative tribunals have been called upon to make factual 
determinations bearing on whether a business is federal or provincial for 
division of powers purposes under sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867,20 there is jurisprudence supporting not only the 
initial primacy of tribunals in making such decisions but also the 
obligation of reviewing courts on ultimate judicial review to give 
respect or deference to at least the factual components of the tribunal’s 
determination.21 
More recently, the Supreme Court accepted the need for deference 
to agency and executive assessment and judgment in a rather different 
constitutional setting. In Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New 
Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice),22 the Court was 
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 Id. For an instance where the Federal Court applied patent unreasonableness to the 
review of this balancing exercise and refused the application for review despite the presence of a 
substantial risk of torture, see Re Jaballah, [2006] F.C.J. No. 404, at para. 18, 2006 FC 346. This 
judgment was criticized trenchantly by Audrey Macklin in “On rationalizing handing a human 
being over to likely torture” The Lawyers Weekly (2 June 2006), at 24. However, MacKay J. 
emphasized that he was only reviewing the refusal of a protection order under s. 112 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. The issue might well take on different 
dimensions in the face of a deportation order: see para. 17. 
19
 Supra, note 10, at para. 78. 
20
 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
21
 See e.g., Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] S.C.J. No. 
27, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322, at paras. 40-42. 
22
 [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 [hereinafter “Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. 
of New Brunswick”]. 
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evaluating the implementation of its call in Reference re Remuneration 
of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island23 for the 
creation of judicial compensation commissions as a way of ensuring the 
institutional independence of provincially appointed judges. More 
particularly, the issue of principle was the role of the courts in judicially 
reviewing any decision of the government rejecting or modifying the 
recommendation of the independent commission.24  
In Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island Reference, the Court 
had accepted the entitlement of the government to reject a commission’s 
recommendation provided that the decision to reject could be defended 
on the standard of rationality. In Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New 
Brunswick, the Court went on to elaborate how that fed into the judicial 
review process. It was not a situation where the reviewing court was 
obliged to evaluate the government’s decision by reference to a standard 
of correctness.  
The reviewing court is not asked to determine the adequacy of judicial 
remuneration. Instead, it must focus on the government’s response and 
on whether the purpose of the commission process has been achieved. 
This is a deferential review which acknowledges both the 
government’s unique position and accumulated expertise and its 
constitutional responsibility for management of the province’s 
financial affairs.25 
In its precise application, the Court saw this process of deferential 
review as involving a two-stage inquiry: whether there were legitimate 
reasons for the rejection of the commission’s recommendations and, if 
so, whether there was a “reasonable factual foundation” for those 
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 [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Provincial Court of Prince 
Edward Island Reference”]. 
24
 It is interesting to note that in the Court’s judgment in Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of 
New Brunswick, the basis for judicial independence is said to rest in the common law and the 
constitution (supra, note 22, at para. 4), and there is no specific reference to the Charter. This is in 
contrast to Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island Reference, where the guarantee of 
independence for the provincially appointed judges was found primarily in s. 11(d) of the Charter, 
applicable by reason of the fact that such judges have extensive criminal law jurisdiction. However, 
it is also worth recollecting that Lamer C.J. prefaced his judgment by accepting that the argument 
for independence could also be made from the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and 
underlying constitutional principles. Given that there is no reference to the Charter in the more 
recent case, one wonders whether the Court has now fully endorsed the alternative ground in the 
earlier case and placed interference with the independence of provincially appointed judges beyond 
the possibility of legislative override and the realm of a s. 1 justification, both possibilities to the 
extent that the protection was solely Charter-based. 
25
 Supra, note 22, at para. 30. 
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legitimate reasons.26 The latter inquiry is obviously deferential and while 
the former does not self-evidently contain an element of deference, at 
least part of the Court’s explication of what constitute legitimate reasons 
does have that effect. Indeed, it defines a process as much as a review of 
the merits of the reasons for rejection: 
Reasons that are complete and that deal with the commission’s 
recommendations in a meaningful way will meet the standard of 
rationality. Legitimate reasons must be compatible with the common 
law and the Constitution. The government must deal with the issues at 
stake in good faith. Bald expressions of rejection or disapproval are 
inadequate. Instead, the reasons must show that the commission’s 
recommendations have been taken into account and must be based on 
facts and sound reasoning. They must state in what respect and to what 
extent they depart from the recommendations, articulating the grounds 
for rejection or variation. The reasons should reveal a consideration of 
the judicial office and an intention to deal with it appropriately. They 
must preclude any suggestion of attempting to manipulate the 
judiciary. The reasons must reflect the underlying public interest in 
having a commission process, being the depoliticization of the 
remuneration process and the need to preserve judicial independence.27 
In many ways, the concept of legitimacy in this setting is met by 
adherence to a heightened sense of what constitutes adequate reasons 
under the common law prescription of an obligation to give reasons 
endorsed authoritatively for the first time in Baker v. Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration)28 as part of the common law governing 
statutory authorities. 
Returning to Suresh, the Court also makes it clear there that 
deference to executive or tribunal discretion will intrude indirectly in the 
determination of what fundamental justice requires in a procedural 
sense. While the Court has seemingly accepted that, as a matter of 
general law, the standard of review for procedural questions is that of 
correctness,29 what the Court has also done is provide a list of factors or 
considerations that have to be taken into account in evaluating the extent 
of a statutory authority’s procedural obligations. These factors, first 
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 Id., at paras. 30-33. 
27
 Id., at para. 25. 
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 [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
29
 Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 28, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, at para. 100 (per Binnie J.). 
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fully articulated in the leading case of Baker, include the procedural 
choices made by any authority exercising a broad discretion over such 
matters or having field expertise in relation to such determinations.30 
This is undoubtedly a case of expertise intruding through the back door. 
In Suresh, the Court made it clear that the Baker factors governed even 
in situations where procedural claims had a constitutional dimension, as 
under section 7 of the Charter, albeit with emphasis given to the fact that 
the procedural entitlement stemmed from a constitutional guarantee as 
opposed to a “mere” statutory or common law source.31 
Other section 7 case law also apparently supports judicial deference 
to discretionary judgments affecting the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person. Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital32 provides an 
illustration. At stake here was the judgment exercised by Review Boards 
with respect to the continued detention of those found not guilty of 
criminal offences by reason of insanity. With respect to the legal 
meaning of the term “least onerous and least restrictive to the accused”, 
there is no doubt that the Court conducted correctness review in 
determining that, as a matter of law or statutory interpretation, this 
applied to the possible range of custodial conditions within a particular 
institution. However, had the Review Board got that determination 
correct in this particular case, Binnie J., delivering the judgment of the 
Court, made it clear that it would have been entitled to considerable 
deference in terms of its actual exercise of discretion as to the patient’s 
conditions of custody: 
 The job of the appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence, nor 
to substitute our views for those of the Review Board. We accept the 
findings of the Review Board with regard to the appellant and other 
relevant circumstances, which are supported by the evidence. The 
problem is that the result was skewed by the Review Board’s error of 
law.33 
The Court also makes reference to another of its decisions in this 
same arena, R. v. Owen34 and states that there  
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 Baker, supra, note 28, at para. 27. 
31
 Supra, note 10, at para. 114. 
32
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 66, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 528 [hereinafter “Pinet”]. 
33
 Id., at para. 27. 
34
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 31, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 779. 
236 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
. . . [it] acknowledged the expertise of the members appointed to 
Review Boards, and established that their views of how best to 
manage the risks posed by a particular NCR accused should not be 
interfered with so long as the conditions of detention lie within a range 
of reasonable judgment.35 
The message seems clear: When Charter rights and freedoms are at 
stake, statutory authorities must get the law correct; however, thereafter, 
their judgments about the facts and exercises of discretion based on 
those facts are entitled to deference or respect by the Court. In other 
words, the Court is eschewing the micromanaging, in the name of 
correctness review, of bodies such as Review Boards, the work of which 
invariably involves a Charter right or freedom. Indeed, though this is 
probably to extrapolate too much from the judgment in Pinet, it might 
conceivably also be seen as an answer to the question left open in 
Suresh: By what standard should the courts conduct a review of 
executive discretions to deport someone who is a threat to national 
security, even when there is a substantial threat of torture? To the extent 
that this is a decision that involves factual inquiries and determinations 
and the balancing of a range of competing factors, the statutory 
authority’s decision is entitled to a considerable measure of deference, 
provided it is operating within the correct legal standards.36 
Another way of describing such a review regime, from an 
Administrative Law perspective, would be to state that under a 
pragmatic and functional analysis, questions of pure constitutional law 
will always be reviewed on a correctness basis. In terms of the elements 
in that analysis, the nature of the question and considerations of 
comparative expertise coalesce to indicate that the statutory authority 
has no entitlement to deference. However, when the issues cease to be 
pure questions of law and engage the fact-finding capacities of the 
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 Supra, note 32, at para. 22. 
36
 In both Suresh and Pinet, however, there is a complicating element. Clearly, in Suresh, 
the Court is of the view that deportation to torture should be an exceptional event (at para. 78). In 
Pinet, the Court also expressed the view that the s. 7 rights of the applicant should be a “major 
preoccupation of the Review Board” (at para. 19). Both amount to apparent legal constraints or 
limitations on the discretion of the decision-maker. As such, presumably, any review of the exercise 
of each of these discretions then becomes that much more intrusive in that the reviewing court is 
required to ask, in the one case, whether the discretion was exercised in a frame of mind that saw 
deportation to torture as an exceptional occurrence and, in the other, whether the Review Board did 
have a “major preoccupation” with the liberty interest of the applicant. While that does not mean 
correctness review, it certainly narrows the frame of reference within which the decision-maker is 
entitled to deference in exercising judgment as opposed to finding facts. 
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statutory authority and/or the exercise of discretion or judgment that 
engages their expertise, the fact that constitutional rights and freedoms 
are in issue does not automatically mean correctness review; there is 
room for deference at least in some contexts. It is not, of course, at this 
point to make a judgment on whether this is appropriate or a good thing; 
it simply describes how cases in which constitutional questions arise are 
accommodated within the standard review practices of the courts in 
Administrative Law cases.  
III. MULTANI — THE MINORITY JUDGMENT 
Indeed, this point of view corresponds very much to that advanced by 
two members of the Court in the very recent judgment in Multani v. 
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.37 There, in a judgment 
concurring in the outcome reached by the majority, Deschamps and 
Abella JJ. proposed that the general principles of judicial review of 
administrative action should apply to all exercises of discretion, 
including those that engage Charter rights and freedoms. Indeed, they 
found support for that position,38 not in Suresh, Ahani and Pinet, but in 
two other judgments of the Court, Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia College of Teachers39 and Chamberlain v. Surrey School 
District No. 36,40 as well as more general references to Baker.41 They 
also argued, as advanced above, that the cases in which the Court had 
accepted that correctness was the invariable standard of review where 
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 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 2006 SCC 6 [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
38
 Id., at para. 94. 
39
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [hereinafter “Trinity Western”]. Here, as a 
prelude to reviewing an accreditation process that involved an apparent collision of Charter rights 
and freedoms, the Court conducted a pragmatic and functional analysis to determine the standard 
for review of the College’s decision and reached the conclusion that it should be correctness: at 
paras. 15-19. 
40
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 [hereinafter “Chamberlain”]. In this instance, 
the majority in fact never reached the Charter challenge, but rather decided the case on the basis of 
Administrative Law principles using an unreasonableness standard of review. 
41
 Multani, supra, note 37, at para. 86, referring to Baker, supra, note 28, at para. 56, and, 
in particular, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s oft-quoted statement that discretion must be exercised 
. . . in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of 
law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and 
the principles of the Charter. 
This statement in fact raises another issue about deference: What impact does Multani have in cases 
where the argument is not so much that there has been a Charter violation but that discretion has 
been exercised without regard for Charter “values”?  
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constitutional questions were at stake were all ones involving challenges 
to the validity of a provision, not a decision.  
[W]e do not believe that Martin established a rule that simply raising 
an argument based on human rights makes administrative law 
inapplicable, or that all decisions contested under the Canadian 
Charter or provincial human rights legislation are subject to the 
correctness standard.42  
Multani involved a challenge to a decision by a school board’s 
governing board and council of commissioners overturning an initial 
decision by the administrative officials of the board that a student could 
wear an authentic kirpan at school under certain conditions, 
notwithstanding the school’s Code of Conduct that prohibited the 
carrying of weapons. At stake was whether this was an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the governing board and council of 
commissioners, particularly if the matter in issue engaged the student’s 
freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter.  
According to Deschamps and Abella JJ., it was not only preferable 
but also, as a matter of Charter theory, mandatory for the Court to 
approach this question within a standard Administrative Law review 
framework and, more particularly, against the backdrop of a pragmatic 
and functional analysis.  
What did this mean in terms of carrying out the review function on 
the facts of this case? For the two judges, there was a potential contest 
between the student’s freedom of religion and the “right of all students 
to physical inviolability”.43 It was also a balancing exercise that might 
turn out differently as among different schools. Factual assessment was 
integral to the exercise. 
Where safety in the schools under its responsibility is concerned, the 
respondent school board unquestionably has greater expertise than 
does a court of law reviewing its decision. If the reasonableness 
standard applied in Chamberlain, there is even more reason to 
conclude that it applies in the instant case because of the factual 
element associated with the determinations of safety requirements.44 
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The duo then proceeded to analyze the discretionary determination 
of the council of commissioners by reference to the reasonableness 
standard and concluded that its decision was unreasonable because it 
“did not sufficiently consider either the right to freedom of religion or 
the accommodation measure proposed by the father and the student”.45  
For Deschamps and Abella JJ., this was a much more apt process 
than trying to accommodate review of administrative discretions that 
implicated Charter rights and freedoms within the framework of the 
Oakes46 (and its progeny’s) formula for assessing justifications of 
constitutional violations by reference to section 1. Indeed, they saw that 
process of constitutional justification as “developed uniquely” for the 
assessment of a “norm of general application”. It was not apt for the 
evaluation of the individualized decisions of statutory authorities and 
would only lead to an unsatisfactory “blurring [of] the distinction 
between the principles of constitutional justification and the principles 
of administrative law” in a way that would result in “the impairment of 
the analytical tools developed specifically for each of these fields”.47  
Indeed, the joint judgment goes even further in asserting that the 
Court got it wrong in cases such as Slaight Communications Inc. v. 
Davidson48 to the extent that it accepted that section 1 had relevance to 
individualized exercises of statutory powers. In so doing, Deschamps 
and Abella JJ. revisited the old debate as to the meaning of the term 
“prescribed by law” in section 1 and urged that the Court reverse the 
position that this threshold to the very applicability of section 1 engaged 
anything other than a statute, regulation, or other binding normative 
instrument. More particularly, it should not be read to include as “law” 
for these purposes the determination or decision of a statutory authority. 
“Law” and the possibility of a justification for constitutional violations 
should be restricted to “rules of general application”.49 
IV. MULTANI — THE MAJORITY JUDGMENT 
However, the majority of the Court rejected this position. Justice 
Charron (McLachlin C.J., Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ. concurring) 
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asserted that the duo courted the risk of “reduc[ing] the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter to mere 
administrative law principles or, at the very least, caus[ing] confusion 
between the two”.50 Rather, the integrity of the Charter would be 
maintained only if the Court itself defined the scope of the protection 
offered by its rights and freedoms and, in the event of a violation, only 
upheld the governmental action if it met the requirements of section 1. 
In this realm, particularly as the case was based entirely on the 
constitutional right to freedom of religion, there was no room for the 
intrusion of the Administrative Law standard of “unreasonableness”. 
Where the challenge was to an administrative decision “based on the 
application and interpretation of the Canadian Charter”,51 the Supreme 
Court’s own jurisprudence dictated correctness review. 
In elaborating, the majority then went on to assert that unless the 
Court was being asked to reconcile two constitutional rights by drawing 
internal limits on the scope of freedom of religion, any concerns with 
competing values should be left to the section 1 contextual analysis.52 In 
other words, any non-constitutional interests of the state in reining in 
religious freedom was not the proper subject of a balancing exercise at 
the infringement stage but could only play a role as part of a section 1 
justification where the onus was clearly on the state. The task of the 
person claiming an infringement of the right was to show 
(1) that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a 
nexus with religion, and (2) that the impugned conduct of a third party 
interferes, in a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his 
or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief.53 
Then, in the application of those standards to the facts of the case, the 
majority did its own apparent de novo assessment of the evidence on the 
record and came to the conclusion that the student had met both 
preconditions. Moreover, particularly when it is juxtaposed against the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal,54 it also looks like acceptance of the 
legitimacy of correctness review of the statutory authority’s determination 
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of the student’s claims for exemption from or accommodation in the 
application of the no weapons rule on the basis of religious belief. For the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, Lemelin J. (ad hoc) had assessed the statutory 
authority’s decision not to support accommodation of the student’s 
religious belief on the basis of an unreasonableness standard of review.55 
The majority of the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that 
the statutory authority was entitled to any degree of deference and then 
did its own assessment of the evidence and arguments on the critical 
elements of the claim of violation. 
Not surprisingly, the same is true of the next stage of the process: 
the consideration of the section 1 justification. Certainly, Charron J. 
gives the standard nod in favour of not demanding perfection of 
legislators and decision-makers at the minimal impairment stage of the 
Oakes test proportionality analysis: “the courts must accord some 
leeway”.56 In deciding whether there has been minimal impairment, 
“perfection” is not demanded, only a solution that comes “within a 
range of reasonable alternatives”.57 However, in its subsequent 
consideration of all of the statutory authority’s arguments and, in 
particular, the claim that nothing short of an absolute ban would do to 
fulfill legitimate objectives, the majority judgment engages in a full 
evaluation of the evidence and the arguments with not a whiff of 
deference or suggestion that there might be room for another opinion or 
assessment of the situation. In short, an absolute ban did not come close 
in the Court’s mind to the kind of reasonable alternative that might 
justify some measure of deference at the minimal impairment stage. 
Where does this leave the law with respect to the role of deference 
in Charter cases? Are the Court’s decisions and reasoning in cases such 
as Ahani, Suresh and Pinet reconcilable with the majority judgment in 
Multani? I suppose it might be contended that the group of three are 
section 7 cases and Multani is a section 2(a) freedom of religion case. It 
might also be contended that given the apparently very short shrift that 
the governing board and council of commissioners gave to Multani’s 
freedom of religion assertion, the Court had no alternative but to 
conduct correctness review or its own assessment of the merits of the 
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claim. There is simply no entitlement to deference when the statutory 
authority in effect does not face up to a constitutional or Charter claim 
or fails to deal with it within the legal framework that the Court’s 
Charter jurisprudence demands.  
However, neither of those attempts at distinguishing is really all that 
plausible. First, I do not see any relevant difference for these purposes 
between decision-making that engages the section 7 guarantees of 
fundamental justice when life, liberty and security of the person are at 
stake and decision-making that implicates freedom of religion. 
Secondly, the majority is quite dogmatic: Administrative Law standards 
and principles have no application in cases where the courts are 
assessing exercises of statutory power against the guarantees provided 
by the Charter. There is no sense in the elaboration that the situation 
might vary as among various provisions of the Charter or be affected by 
the extent to which (if at all) the statutory authority has itself addressed 
the Charter issues. Rather, the standard of review is that of correctness.  
Indeed, the majority makes it clear that it rejects the minority’s 
perspective that automatic correctness review only applies in cases 
where the court is considering the validity of legislation as opposed to 
the validity of decisions taken under legislation. Not only does the Court 
affirm the application of Martin and its assertion of correctness review 
in the context of individualized decision-making and discretionary 
exercises of power, but it also refers with approval to the following 
statement in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15:58 
As the Court recognized, “an administrative tribunal acting pursuant to 
its delegated powers exceeds its jurisdiction if it makes an order that 
infringes the Charter”. . . . 59 
Indeed, at the risk of inappropriately re-insinuating the principles of 
Administrative Law which Multani explicitly outlaws, I would venture to 
say that what the majority is in effect doing is making the assertion that 
Charter questions always go to jurisdiction and attract correctness review 
whether it is a matter of pure law, mixed law and fact, or pure fact. 
In short, it is my view that the judgment in Multani cannot coexist 
with the three earlier judgments where the Court accepted the legitimacy 
of some degree of deference to at least certain species of individualized 
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decision-making that implicated Charter rights and freedoms.60 The pity, 
of course, is that the Court does not at any point refer to any one of 
these three judgments. It is also, in my view, the case that these three 
judgments do not find a true surrogate in the judgment of the duo, so 
directly or explicitly rejected by the majority. In particular, there is no 
suggestion in any of the three that section 1 has no relevance to 
situations of individualized decision-making. Indeed, Suresh certainly 
contemplates a continued role for section 1 in such cases. In other 
words, what the Court did in these three cases in no way carries with it 
the implication that Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson61 is 
incorrect in its reading of “prescribed by law” to include the actual 
outcomes of individualized decision-making. The theory and practice of 
deference articulated in these three cases in no way requires acceptance 
of the duo’s sweeping away of that part of Charter law.62 
V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA 
If I am accurate in my assessment that there can be no reconciliation 
between Multani and the other three decisions to which I refer, what is 
to be done? It is, after all, quite problematic to have the Court espousing 
two inconsistent theories of the relationship between Constitutional and 
Administrative Law review and to simply leave the matter of which one 
has purchase in a particular case to apparently random selection. What is 
clearly demanded of the Court is that on an appropriate occasion (and, it 
is to be hoped, sooner rather than later), it recognize the dilemma and 
come up with an overarching vision of how, if at all, courts should 
accommodate concepts of deference in constitutional litigation. 
Moreover, as my colleague David Stratas has pointed out,63 any such 
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overall evaluation must take account not only, on the one hand, of the 
role of deference in sections 91 and 92 litigation but also, on the other 
hand, that the Court typically affords no deference to individualized 
decision-making by public officials when it deals with section 8 search 
and seizure issues in a criminal context, in this instance police officers 
determining whether or not to conduct a search. It is only against the 
backdrop of such a realization of the varying contexts in which this can 
become an issue that the Court is likely to come up with a coherent 
theory which can be drawn on irrespective of context. 
In all of this, there is, of course, no gainsaying the majority position 
in Multani that full, correctness review of any administrative 
determination that affects Charter rights and freedoms could have the 
tendency to increase the occasions on which the Charter will provide 
“protection”. However, there is another reality that emerges very clearly 
from a consideration of the impact of applying Multani in situations 
such as those which arose in Pinet. If correctness review becomes the 
order of the day in all Charter contexts, including the determination of 
factual issues and the application of the law to those facts, then what in 
effect can occur is that the courts will perforce assume the role of a de 
novo appellate body from all tribunals the task of which is to make 
decisions that of necessity have an impact on Charter rights and 
freedoms: Review Boards, Parole Boards, prison disciplinary tribunals, 
child welfare authorities and the like. Whether that kind of judicial 
micromanaging of aspects of the administrative process should take 
place is a highly problematic question. It is one that should not be taken 
to have been decided by default in Multani and its blanket rejection of 
any room for the principles of Administrative Law and its standard of 
review analysis in Charter cases.  
In Multani, at least one member of the Court, LeBel J., recognized 
that there were problems with making sweeping assertions of the kind 
emanating from both the majority and the duo:  
Although I agree with the disposition proposed by my colleagues, I 
remain concerned about some aspects of the problems of legal 
methodology raised by this case. As can be seen, the case involves 
diverse legal concepts that, although belonging to fields of law that are 
in principle separate, are still part of a single legal system the 
coherence of which must be adequately ensured. 
. . . 
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The approaches followed to apply the Canadian Charter must be 
especially flexible when it comes to working out the relationship 
between administrative law and constitutional law.64 
This expression of concern seems fully warranted upon a fuller 
consideration of the Supreme Court’s own approaches to this issue in 
other contexts. It is to be hoped that this will prove a lifeline for counsel 
wishing to assert in a later case that standard of review analysis and the 
possibility of deference to discretionary decision-making are not always 
the alien concepts that the Multani majority has asserted that they are. 
It is also worth bearing in mind that the Court itself may have 
already provided hints of how the dilemma might be resolved 
satisfactorily. While the Court in an Administrative Law setting has 
rejected the contention that it should recognize a greater gradation of 
standards of review than the three currently accepted standards of 
[in]correctness, unreasonableness and patent unreasonableness,65 I 
assume that that has not precluded consideration of whether there needs 
to be a somewhat different approach to the review of exercises of power 
engaging constitutional questions and Charter rights and freedoms in 
particular.  
As we have seen, one way of doing this is to place greater emphasis 
on the nature of the right that is at stake in either conducting a pragmatic 
and functional analysis for the purposes of substantive review or, in the 
domain of procedural fairness or fundamental justice, as part of the 
Baker factors used to establish the strength of any claim to procedural 
fairness. This would, however, involve a concession that Multani should 
not be read as imposing a universal standard of correctness review on 
every situation when Charter rights and freedoms are at issue 
irrespective of the nature of the issue before the Court, be it law, mixed 
law and fact, or fact. It would also force the issue whether, for these 
purposes, the courts should acknowledge that there is a hierarchy of 
constitutional rights and freedoms or at least varying levels of harm 
caused by a failure to afford proper recognition to constitutional rights 
and freedoms. A decision which may send someone to death and torture 
at the hands of a barbarous regime may indeed have more constitutional 
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significance than routine decisions about the level of security in which 
those detained in psychiatric institutions are housed.  
However, there is another way of creating a compromise or point in 
between conceptions of deference derived from Administrative Law 
(unreasonableness or patent unreasonableness review) and correctness 
review. In standard judicial review, the onus rests with the applicant to 
establish a basis for judicial review by reference to whatever standard is 
produced by the pragmatic and functional analysis. As Provincial Court 
Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick 66 makes clear, that is not the only 
framework within which deferential judicial review of discretionary 
decision-making or rights determinations can take place. There, as we 
have seen, the Court placed the onus on the government to justify its 
rejection or modification of the recommendations of the various judicial 
remuneration commissions. However, whether the government met that 
onus was not contingent on it showing the correctness of its views and 
the incorrectness of the commissions’ determinations. Rather, the Court 
assessed its rationale for departing from those recommendations on the 
basis of the manner it went about justifying its decisions: a process of 
judicial evaluation that focused on the extent to which the government 
gave reasons that genuinely addressed the position of the commission 
and provided a rational basis for departing from it, and one that was 
sustainable on a reasonable view of the facts.  
While the Court does not explicitly acknowledge the work of David 
Dyzenhaus, there are distinct echoes here of his theory of deference as 
respect,67 a theory that L’Heureux-Dubé J. endorsed in her majority 
judgment in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration).68 Reduced to its core, what the Court is calling for is a 
combination of more elaborate and clearly articulated reasons and 
greater attention to the rights at stake as a precondition to respect for the 
agency’s judgment and expertise; a culture of justification where 
constitutional questions, including those affecting Charter rights and 
freedoms, are at stake.69 It is not, however, the kind of justification that 
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forms the basis of section 1 analysis and, to that extent, this approach is 
closer to that of the duo in Multani than that of the majority. 
Nonetheless, it certainly does have strong claims for recognition outside 
the world of judicial remuneration commissions and the protection of 
the institutional independence of judges.    
This notion of deference having to be earned also intrudes in the 
judgment of Binnie J. in Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital.70 
There, he makes it clear that the requirement that the reviewing Court be 
restrained in its scrutiny of the Review Board’s assessments is predicated 
on the Review Board approaching its task with the section 7 rights of the 
detainee as “a major preoccupation”.71 In other words, the Court will be 
justified in intervening if the Board has failed to take the section 7 rights 
adequately into account in balancing the various considerations bearing 
upon its decision. Presumably, as in Provincial Court Judges Assn. of 
New Brunswick, whether that has occurred will be evaluated on the basis 
of the justifications provided by the Board and the extent to which those 
justifications find a reasonable basis in the facts.72 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Multani’s assertion that correctness is the invariable standard of review 
when Charter rights and freedoms are at stake is not supported by prior 
Supreme Court of Canada authority and, as a matter of an appropriate 
standard for the review of the exercise of discretions that engage Charter 
rights and freedoms, is too blunt an approach. There is room for 
deference to the discretionary judgments of statutory authorities 
exercising powers that have the potential to affect Charter rights and 
freedoms. To accept this is not to devalue inappropriately those Charter 
rights and freedoms. However, to prevent this devaluation from 
occurring, there should be recognition that the framework within which 
deference operates will often, perhaps invariably, need to be different 
than it is in the case of judicial review of administrative action that does 
not affect Charter rights and freedoms. In my view, the genesis for this 
approach can be found in the Supreme Court’s judgment in the recent 
Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick case where the Court 
requires the relevant state actor to justify its entitlement to deference 
from the reviewing court by providing reasons that show a heightened 
awareness of the constitutional rights at stake and a rational basis in 
terms of the parameters of those rights and the facts to justify the court 
exercising restraint.  
 
 
